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MALICE IN WONDERLAND: FICTIONALIZED QUOTATIONS AND
THE CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED SUBSTANTIAL TRUTH
DOCTRINE
The courts have recently been called upon to determine whether
a quotation that has been deliberately altered by its publisher
gives rise to a claim of defamation. The Supreme Court has
ruled that a 'fictionalization" is not false unless it alters the
substance of what was actually said. The author contends that
this rule is flawed and proposes that any deviation from the
words actually spoken be considered false.
INTRODUCTION
A VIETNAM WAR protester shouts, "War is evil! Down with
the draft!" but the reporter quotes the protester as exclaiming
"Fuck the draft!"1 An opponent of Nicola Sacco's and Bartolomeo
Vanzetti's executions declares, "I am outraged at this immoral act
and hold Governor Fuller responsible," but the reporter quotes the
opponent as saying "Governor Fuller murdered Sacco and
Vanzetti. ' 2
This note examines the issues raised when a speaker, as
above, is misquoted and brings a libel action to recover damages
from the publisher' of the misquotation. A necessary element of a
libel action is the finding of a false statement of fact.4 Unfortu-
nately, the question of what constitutes a false statement of fact in
1. This hypothetical is based on Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (discussed
infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text).
2. This hypothetical is based on Commonwealth v. Canter, 269 Mass. 359, 168 N.E.
790 (1929), discussed in Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay
in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REv. 263, 263-66 (1978).
3. In the context of defamation, the term "publisher" is given a broad construction.
A publisher is any person who facilitates the "publication" of a misquotation. A publica-
tion is "[any act by which the defamatory matter is intentionally or negligently communi-
cated to a third person." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 577 comment a (1976).
Under some circumstances, even "transitory gestures" can constitute publication. Id. (cit-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 comment d).
4. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, Tim LAW OF TORTS § 5.0, at 3-4 (1986)
(liability is based on false statements of fact).
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the context of a misquotation has not been resolved. Two possible
formulations might be used to determine whether a false state-
ment of fact has been made. The first formulation, referred to in
this note as the "literal rule," 5 finds a false statement of fact
whenever there is any deviation from the words actually articu-
lated by the speaker. The second formulation, referred to in this
note as the "essence rule," finds a false statement of fact only
when there is a deviation from both the words actually spoken and
the meaning of those words. The issue, then, is whether the find-
ing of falsely stated facts necessary to support a libel action must
be based on a deviation from the essential meaning of the words
or merely on a deviation from the exact words spoken.6
It may not be immediately apparent that the choice of one
rule over the other has any practical effect or, conceding an actual
effect, that harm flowing from a misquotation is properly viewed
as defamatory. To illuminate the issue involved in choosing be-
tween the literal and essence rules it is helpful to review the two
misquotation examples mentioned above.
It is clear that in both examples the literal rule would hold
the reported quotation to be a false statement of fact: in both in-
stances, the quote deviates from the words actually spoken by the
source. The essence rule, on the other hand, would hold that both
reported quotations are not false statements of fact, since the gen-
eral message of each speaker's statement has been conveyed.'
5. The literal rule is a standard rather than a specific mandate. States would remain
free to adopt this standard and require literal accuracy, or instead to adopt a more lenient
rule under common law or by statute.
6. It might be contended that a quotation should be analyzed as an expression of the
publisher's opinion of what the speaker said. While the Supreme Court has rejected the
contention that all statements of opinion are protected from liability for defamation, "a
statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a proba-
bly false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection." Milkovich v. Lo-
rain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 (1990). Nevertheless, Milkovich does not mean
that a quotation is a potentially protected form of opinion concerning what was said by the
source. To the contrary, it is clear that a quotation is a factual statement that the words
appearing between the quotation marks represent at least the thoughts of the speaker.
Journalistic convention goes further, holding that "[q]uotation marks mean literally that
the words they enclose are exactly as the source gave them-verbatim." M. CHARNLEY &
B. CHARNLEY, REPORTING 248 (4th ed. 1979). For a more detailed discussion of journalis-
tic conventions and ethics regarding quotations, see infra text accompanying notes 74-117.
7. In the first hypothetical, the reporter has conveyed the speaker's opposition to the
draft. The alteration affects the intensity and civility but not the central meaning of the
statement. In the second hypothetical, the reporter has maintained the sting of the actual
statement, choosing to give it a figurative phrasing. The statement would almost certainly
be interpreted figuratively. See infra note 10.
FICTIONALIZED QUOTATIONS
Therefore, whether a plaintiff can succeed in a libel action against
a publisher largely depends upon whether the court applies the
literal or essence rule.
These two misquotation examples also demonstrate that al-
tered quotations can be, but are not necessarily, defamatory.8 The
reporter in the first example has accurately captured the pro-
tester's sentiments. However, the profanity used by the reporter is
not considered acceptable under most community standards.9 At-
tribution of profane language to the protester tends to lower the
misquoted speaker in the estimation of the community. In the sec-
ond example, however, the misquotation attributed to the oppo-
nent of the executions is not likely to be considered defamatory.
First, the words themselves fail to cast aspersion on the speaker. 10
Further, although the quotation has been altered, the misquota-
tion conveys the same message as would have been conveyed had
no alteration occurred. This result obviates any claim that the
speaker has been falsely associated with a disreputable position.
This note seeks to determine whether the literal or essence
rule is more harmonious with the various interests implicated in
the defamation context. To make this determination, an examina-
tion is first made of Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,-1 the
only case to present precisely this issue."2
The literal and essence rules are then examined in light of the
8. A statement "is defamatory if it tends. . . to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
559 (1976).
9. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 237-38 (2d ed. 1989) (the word "fuck"
has been "[flor centuries, and [is] still by the great majority, regarded as a taboo word.").
10. It is most likely that these words would be construed figuratively as meaning that
Governor Fuller is morally culpable rather than legally blameworthy. See Greenbelt Coop.
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (characterization of action as "blackmail"
construed figuratively); R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 74-75 (1980)
(the conclusion as to whether a word is construed in a figurative or literal sense is depen-
dent upon jurisdiction, context, and historical period). There are some exceptions. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. Canter, 269 Mass. 359, 371-72, 168 N.E. 790, 790-91 (1929) (holding
that the statement "Fuller-Murderer of Sacco and Vanzetti" should be construed as
meaning Fuller committed murder). Construed as in Canter, the words in the second hypo-
thetical might be libelous, since they are so clearly erroneous that the speaker would ap-
pear to be at least hysterical and at worst a liar. Such a construction would "tend[] . . . to
harm the reputation of [the speaker] as to lower him in the estimation of the community."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559.
11. 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989), modified on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc,
895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991). All references to the Ninth
Circuit's opinion will be to the modified opinion reported at 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1990).
12. See infra notes 19-73 and accompanying text.
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functions of journalism 3 and the manner in which the general
public digests the information it receives from the media.' 4
Next, the note analyzes how well each rule balances the com-
peting interests involved. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"8
the Supreme Court held that the first amendment limits defama-
tion actions. The Court has since applied a balancing test to re-
solve new issues in defamation. The Court has mandated that the
social interests embodied in the Constitution" be balanced against
the individual interests contained therein' to achieve the result
that most harmoniously accommodates all interests.' 8 Using this
test, the note concludes that the literal rule should prevail.
I. THE MASSON CASE
A. The Ninth Circuit Opinion
The issue of whether the essence or literal rule should be
adopted presented itself directly in Masson v. New Yorker Maga-
zine, Inc.'9 In Masson, the plaintiff, a psychoanalyst formerly as-
sociated with the Freud Archives, was interviewed by Janet Mal-
colm, a co-defendant, who was preparing a story for The New
Yorker. The interviews were tape recorded. The resulting article
included a series of quotations attributed to the plaintiff that did
not appear on the tape recordings.20 Claiming that he did not
13. See infra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 91-117 and accompanying text.
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. The social interests implicated by a defamation action in the context of an al-
tered quotation are efficient self-government and the attainment of truth through the "mar-
ketplace of ideas." See infra notes 118-78 and accompanying text.
17. The individual interests implicated are self-fulfillment and reputation. See infra
notes 179-211 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 212-27 and accompanying text.
19. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
20. The plaintiff claimed, and the court assumed for the purposes of summary judg-
ment, that a total of nine statements that he did not make were nevertheless attributed to
him. Id. at 1539-46. Among them were the following:
1) Masson was quoted as saying:
Eissler and Anna Freud told me . . . [t]hey like (sic) me well enough 'in
my own room.' They loved to hear from me what creeps and dolts analysts are. I
was like an intellectual gigolo - you get your pleasure from him, but you don't
take him out in public.
Id. at 1540 (emphasis omitted). Masson actually said,
[Eissler and Anna Freud] felt, in a sense, I [Masson] was a private asset but a
public liability. They like (sic) me when I was alone in their living room, and I
could talk and chat and tell them the truth about things and they would tell me.
But that I was, in a sense, much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for
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make these statements and that their attribution to him was de-
famatory, the plaintiff brought an action for libel."1 The District
Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, rul-
ing that "[n] o clear and convincing evidence exists that would jus-
tify a finding that [the defendants] entertained serious doubts
about the truth of the disputed passages."22
In assessing the propriety of this ruling, the Ninth Circuit
began its analysis by assuming that the quotations attributed to
the plaintiff "were deliberately altered."23 The court then sur-
veyed cases from other circuits to derive "[t]he state of the cur-
rent law governing the' defamatory nature of [fabricated quota-
tions] ."24 According to the Ninth Circuit, the current state of the
law held that when a "fabricated quotation[]" was either a "'ra-
these important training analysts to be caught dead with me.
Id. at 1540 (footnote omitted) (brackets in original).
2) Masson was quoted as saying, "if he [Masson] had been allowed to move into Anna
Freud's house in London, the house not only would have been 'a place of scholarship, but it
would also have been a place of sex, women, fun.'" Id. at 1542. Masson actually said, "in
discussing the changes he would make to Freud's home: 'They're going to be calling the
police on me every, every time I give a party or something'; and that 'I could have had
some fun.'" Id.
3) Masson was quoted as saying, "he changed his middle name from Lloyd to Moussaieff
because 'it sounded better.'" Id. at 1539-40. In fact, Masson explained that "he changed
his middle name to Moussaieff because, inter alia, he 'just liked it.'" Id. at 1540.
4) Masson was quoted as saying, "Freud's 'entire theory after he abandoned seduction was
the product of moral cowardice.'" Id. at 1541. Masson actually said, "'I think ...
[Freud] was a great and remarkable thinker but he was still a, a man who just lost his
courage. He was a brilliant mind who didn't have the courage to stick with things that he
knew were true.'" Id. (brackets in original).
5) Masson was quoted as predicting that it would be saidr" 'after Freud, he's [Masson's]
the greatest analyst who ever lived.'" Id. at 1542 (brackets in original). Masson actually
said "'for better or for worse, analysis stands or falls with me now'; 'it's me and Freud
against the rest of the analytic world .. . .Not so, it's me. It's me alone'; and '[I] could
single-handedly bring down the business [of Freudian psychology]." Id. (brackets in
original).
6) Masson was quoted as saying of a stinging quip at Freud, which he delivered at the
conclusion of a paper, "'[t]hat remark about the sterility of psychoanalysis was something
I tacked on at the last minute, and it was totally gratuitous. I don't know why I put it in.'"
Id. Masson actually said, "'the last sentence. . . was. ..[a] possibly gratuitously offen-
sive way to end a paper to a group of analysts.'" Id. (brackets in original)
7) Masson was quoted as responding to his girlfriend's complaint that Masson was insensi-
tive to Dr. Eissler, "'[she] worries too much.'" Id. at 1544. Masson actually noted only
that he and Eissler were not "'close.'" Id.
21. Id. at 1536.
22. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1407 (N.D. Cal.
1987), afl'd, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
23. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537.
24. Id. at 1539.
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tional interpretation[]' of ambiguous remarks" or "[did] not 'alter
the substantive content' of unambiguous remarks," no finding of
actual malice could be sustained.25 The court concluded that ap-
plication of this rule barred the inference of actual malice from
any of the alterations made by the defendants.26
The Masson court's ruling was manifestly unsound. First, the
authorities that were cited to support the majority's reading of the
current state of the law did not support the majority's position.
The court relied on Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche7 as authority for
the proposition that actual malice cannot be inferred from a fic-
tionalized quotation that "do[es] not 'alter the substantive con-
tent' of unambiguous remarks."28 Such a reading of Hotchner is
not justified. The defendant in Hotchner published a Spanish-lan-
guage biography of Ernest Hemingway. The biography quoted
Hemingway describing the plaintiff as "dirty and a terrible ass-
licker. There's something phony about him. I wouldn't sleep in the
same room with him."2 When translated into English, the quota-
tion was toned down by the publisher to read "I don't trust
him."30 After failing to persuade the Second Circuit that the "ass-
licker" quotation was falsely attributed to Hemingway, the plain-
tiff claimed that liability should be imposed "simply because [the
defendant] knowingly published a bowdlerized version of Heming-
way's alleged statement." 3' The Hotchner court disagreed, holding
that although the defendant "was fictionalizing . . . the change
did not increase the defamatory impact . . . of Hemingway's
25. Id. (quoting Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 452
(3d Cir. 1987). This rule creates a distinction between two categories of factual statements:
ambiguous and unambiguous. However, there is no bright line between these categories,
nor did the Masson court provide a test for determining whether a quote is or is not ambig-
uous. Detailed analysis on the propriety of making a distinction between ambiguous and
unambiguous factual statements is beyond the scope of this note, but such a distinction
may be impractical or impossible. See generally B. RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS
SCOPE AND LIMITS 94-103 (1948) (explaining that "the meaning of a word is always more
or less vague except in logic and pure mathematics" Id. at 98.); F. WAISMANN, PRINCIPLES
OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY (1965) (explaining the irregularities of language and the ne-
cessity of verifying ambiguous language). In fact the Masson court itself seemed uncom-
fortable with this distinction, ruling without explanation that eight of the nine altered quo-
tations were unambiguous remarks. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1540-44. The court did not
explain its characterization of the remaining statement as ambiguous. Id. at 1544.
26. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1544.
27. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
28. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539 (quoting Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914).
29. Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914.
30. Id.
31. Id.
1276 [Vol. 41:1271
FICTIONALIZED QUOTATIONS
statement"3 2 and that "[iif [the defendant] could not have been
liable for publishing the uncut version, it cannot be liable for de-
ciding to make the passage less offensive."33 The Hotchner court
did not hold, as the Masson court stated, that malice will not be
inferred if the quoted language does not "'alter the substantive
content' of unambiguous remarks."' Instead, the Hotchner
court's decision was premised on the absence of harm to the plain-
tiff's reputation.35
The Masson court also relied on Dunn v. Gannett New York
Newspapers, Inc. 6 for the proposition that actual malice cannot
be inferred from "fabricated quotations [that] are . . . 'rational
interpretations' of ambiguous remarks. 13 7 This reliance is again
misguided. In Dunn, the Mayor of Elizabeth, New Jersey, attrib-
uted the city's litter problems to recent immigrants. A local Span-
ish-language newspaper, interpreting the Mayor's comments to
mean that Hispanics in Elizabeth are litterbugs, ran a headline
stating that "Alcalde. . . LLAMA 'CERDOS' A LOS HISPA-
NOS."3 The Dunn court did not consider the word cerdos, which
appeared in single quotation marks, to have been a direct quote.
The court noted that the publisher used this punctuation to indi-
cate a figurative usage of the word, rather than a direct quota-
tion.3" In addition, the holding and reasoning of the case were
based on the peculiar factual backdrop of translating speech into a
language foreign to the speaker. Relying on this factual twist, the
court held that when a plaintiff fails to offer "factual evidence of
actual malice . . . a fair, albeit inadequate, translation," will pre-
clude a finding of actual malice.40 The leniency afforded a misquo-
tation in the translating process, central to the holding in Dunn, is
32. Id.
33. Id!
34. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539 (quoting Hotchner, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.
1977)).
35. Hotchner established the principle that in assessing defamatory impact, the court
should not compare the plaintiff's reputation after the altered quotation to the plaintiff's
reputation before the quotation. Rather, the relevant inquiry compares the plaintiff's repu-
tation after the fictionalized quotation with what the plaintiff's reputation would have been
had a verbatim quotation been published. See Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914.
36. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
37. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539 (quoting Dunn, 833 F.2d at 452).
38. Dunn, 833 F.2d at 448. In English, the headline would read "Mayor
CALLS HISPANICS 'PIGS."' Id.
39. Id. at 451 (the court relied upon an affidavit which explained that quotation
marks used in Spanish do not necessarily denote a literal quotation.).
40. Id. at 452.
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inapposite to the issue presented in Masson.4
In addition to misinterpreting precedent, the Masson major-
ity failed to recognize the issues before the court. The threshold
inquiry was whether a false statement of fact had been made. The
existence of a false statement of fact is a requisite element in
every defamation case.42 Only when a false statement of fact is
found does the inquiry proceed to the defendant's culpability.43
Thus, the issue in Masson was whether to adopt the literal rule or
the essence rule: only after one rule or the other was chosen and
applied to determine whether any false statement of fact was
made could the Masson court properly turn to the question of
culpability.
41. For further criticism of the Masson majority's treatment of the cited precedents,
see Masson, 895 F.2d at 1554-57 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
42. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
43. Schauer, supra note 2, at 286 ("a court must find falsity before it can determine
malice"). At common law, defamation was an action that "lay for falsehoods communi-
cated . . . by the [publisher] about another . . . to one or more third persons, tending to
injure the reputation of the victim." 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 4, §
5.0, at 3 (footnotes omitted). Because defamation actions were strict liability torts, defend-
ants were required to plead and prove the truth of their statements as an affirmative de-
fense. Id. § 5.20, at 168-69. Nevertheless, "[1liability was on the whole predicated on false
statements of fact." Id. § 5.0, at 3-4. The common law framework for defamation claims
was radically altered when the Supreme Court constitutionalized libel actions brought by
public officials in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In the wake of
this decision and its sweeping rationale, the Court shifted the burden of proving falsity. See
id. at 279. In any defamation action brought after New York Times involving a public
issue, the plaintiff, regardless of his or her status, bears the burden of proving the offending
statement false. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-77 (1986); see
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (requiring public official plaintiffs to prove
falsity). Only after proving falsity does the inquiry move to the defendant's culpability, i.e.,
actual malice for public figure plaintiffs and negligence for private figure plaintiffs. See
Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775-78 (constitutional requirements for plaintiffs that are public offi-
cials are more burdensome than for private figure plaintiffs).
The Hepps Court also noted in dicta that "[w]hen the speech is of exclusively private
concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Dun & Bradstreet, the constitutional
requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of the
common-law landscape." Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775 (discussing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)). Therefore, cases involving private figures
bringing private issue defamation actions retain the common law framework of allocating
to the defendant the burden of proving truth. Moreover, such actions are governed by the
common law generally and thus require no showing of culpability. Dun & Bradstreet, 472
U.S. at 760-61 (applying the "rationale of the common-law rules"). Because Masson in-
volved private figures and a private issue, the culpability of the defendants was not perti-
nent and the language of Masson allowing a jury to infer culpability has no application.
Liability in such cases is predicated solely on a finding of falsity. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES &
0. GRAY, supra note 4, § 5.0, at 3-4. A failure to distinguish these inquiries and to order
them properly can lead to a dilution of constitutional protection. See infra notes 45-52 and
accompanying text.
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It is important to note that this separation of the inquiries
into falsity and culpability comprises the constitutional armor that
protects the press. A libel plaintiff must carry the burden of proof
on each of the issues in order to recover. To collapse them into a
single inquiry diminishes the burden borne by the plaintiff and
seriously undermines the efficacy of the protection that the first
amendment has been held to afford."
The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that defamation actions
require this two step analysis. Rather than beginning with the dis-
tinct issue of falsity, the court saw the issue as whether it could
infer actual malice.45 Even though the court consistently phrased
the inquiry in terms of inferring actual malice, it was in fact, and
apparently without realizing it, inquiring into the issue of falsity.46
The opening assumption of the court's analysis, that "the quota-
tions were deliberately altered," illustrates its confusion.47 Under
the literal rule, this assumption would decide the case: if a devia-
tion from the words actually used is a falsity, then there must be
actual malice since the deviation is assumed to be deliberate. 48
Only if a deviation from the words actually used is not considered
a falsity is culpability still in issue.
This confused inquiry into falsity instead of culpability is per-
44. Where the plaintiff claims to have been libeled by a publication dealing with a
public issue, the plaintiff must first prove falsity, see supra note 43, and then prove the
requisite degree of culpability. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (public officials
need to show falsity of statements and culpability of "actual malice" before they can re-
cover). When the plaintiff is a private figure claiming to have been defamed by a publica-
tion dealing with a private issue, however, there is no constitutional requirement that cul-
pability be shown. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760-61; see also supra note 43.
Collapsing of issues is therefore of no concern in the Dun & Bradstreet context as there is
only one issue-falsity. Masson, however, admitted that he was required to show both fal-
sity and culpability. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537. This additional burden is the essence of the
constitutional protection in defamation suits.
45. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539.
46. Actual malice in the defamation context has been defined as a statement made
"with knowledge that it [is] false or with reckless disregard of whether it [is] false or not."
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280. Given this definition, it is difficult for any court, even
one which never explicitly acknowledges the issue of falsity, to deal with actual malice
without making an implicit determination as to falsity.
47. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537.
48. However, the court was not dealing with the issue of whether the alterations
were ultimately defamatory. The dissent suggested that between the inquiries into falsity
and culpability, the court should interpose inquiries into the materiality of the alteration
and its defamatory impact. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1562 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The ma-
jority rejected this formulation, at least implicitly, in finding that actual malice could not
be inferred from the inaccuracies at issue and only then moving on to consider defamatory
impact. Id. at 1541.
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haps most clearly revealed in the rule the court announced: no
liability will be imposed where "the fabricated quotations are ei-
ther 'rational interpretations' of ambiguous remarks . . . or do not
'alter the substantive content' of unambiguous remarks."'4 9 This
test does not examine the mental state of the publisher, the proper
culpability inquiry, but rather serves as a means to assess the ac-
curacy of the quotation. By focusing on accuracy, the court is ac-
tually inquiring into the issue of falsity: an inaccurate quote is a
false statement of fact. Further, grounding the test in terms of
"substantive content" demonstrates that the court has adopted a
formulation of the essence rule. By affirming summary judgment
for the publisher, the court rejected the literal rule, and thus im-
plicitly adopted the essence rule.
Because the court inappropriately couched its inquiry into
falsity in terms of culpability, the rule it adopted is less protective
of the press than would be an explicit adoption of the essence rule.
Whenever there is a deviation from the essence of the actual quo-
tation, as defined by Masson, malice may be inferred. Had the
court explicitly adopted the essence rule in determining whether
the statement is false, the plaintiff would still have to present evi-
dence of actual malice. Thus, by conflating the culpability inquiry
and the determination of falsity, the court has diluted the protec-
tion it sought to extend. In addition, by mixing together distinct
issues, the court needlessly complicates the legal standards.
An examination of the two-step process will illustrate this
point. Under an explicitly adopted essence rule, the plaintiff must
first prove that the attributed quotation deviates from the substan-
tive meaning of the words actually spoken. If successful, the plain-
tiff must then prove that the false quotation was published with
the requisite culpability. The Masson formulation allows culpabil-
ity to be inferred from a deviation from the substantive meaning
alone.50 Such a standard eviscerates the protection that the culpa-
bility requirement was intended to afford.
Since the Masson court adopted the essence rule implicitly
and without recognizing the issue presented to it, no analysis of
the rule is provided. 51 For this reason, the rule enunciated in Mas-
49. Id. at 1539 (quoting Dunn, 833 F.2d at 452.
50. Id.
51. The Masson court's failure to provide an analysis of the essence rule also results
from the court's misguided reliance on Dunn and Hotchner as precedents. See supra notes
27-41 and accompanying text.
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son is inherently suspect. Moreover, by combining the separate in-
quiries of falsity and culpability, the court has failed to ade-
quately appreciate the distinct constitutional dimensions of these
inquiries.52
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.53 The Court ex-
pressly rejected the literal rule54 but nevertheless reversed the
Ninth Circuit's holding.55 The Supreme Court employed a differ-
ent analysis, which lead it to a distinct formulation of the essence
rule.
The Supreme Court recognized that under existing doctrine
the inquiries into falsity and culpability are separate and the bur-
den of proving falsity rests with the plaintiff.5" The Masson Court
then went further, holding that the first amendment governs the
substance of the falsity inquiry, not just the allocation of the proof
burden. In the Court's own words, "[t]he constitutional question"
it faced was "whether the requisite falsity inheres in the attribu-
tion of words to the petitioner which he did not speak. ' 57 The
Court also discussed "the falsity required to prove actual mal-
ice" 581 and "falsity in the sense relevant to determining actual mal-
ice under the First Amendment."5 9
The obvious implication of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan0
is that defamed plaintiffs must prove falsity. It would be nonsense
to require a plaintiff to prove that a defendant had knowledge that
a statement was false without first proving the statement itself
false.61 The Court made this implication explicit in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps by allocating to the plaintiff the bur-
52. This error did not pass unnoticed. In his dissent, Judge Kozinski proposed a five
step analysis. Under his analysis, the court would examine the culpability of the publisher
only after it has determined that the purported verbatim repetitions are materially inaccu-
rate and defamatory. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1562 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
53. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., II1 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
54. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (1991).
55. Id. at 2437.
56. Id. at 2433 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775
(1986)).
57. Id. at 2431.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2431-32.
60. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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den of proving falsity.62 In doing so, the Court limited its holding
to the allocation of the burden of proof, abjuring imposition of
substantive standards of falsity, and thus extended first amend-
ment coverage only as far as necessarily implied by New York
Times. 3 By determining that the first amendment compels the use
of a particular rule in determining whether a statement is false,
the Supreme Court has extended the first amendment's coverage
beyond its previous boundaries, and beyond the necessary implica-
tions of New York Times.
Having determined that the first amendment governs the rule
by which falsity is determined, it was left for the Court to articu-
late this rule. The Court decided to adopt the common law "sub-
stantial truth" doctrine.64 Under this formulation, an altered quo-
tation is false only if the modification "effects [a] material change
in meaning." 6 The Court rejected the literal rule, even with an
exception for "cleaned up" quotations, reasoning that under such
a rule, "the practice of journalism, which the First Amendment
standard is designed to protect, would require a radical change,
one inconsistent with our precedents and First Amendment princi-
ples."68 The Court offered little substantiation for this claim. It
noted that the practices of reconstructing quotations after an in-
terview and of editing quotations would be impinged. 6 The Court
also observed that there may be instances when the actual words
62. 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986); see R. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION §
5.03[4], at 5-6 (1990).
63. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 779 n.4; R. SMOLLA, supra note 62, § 5.07, at 5-10.
64. "The common law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity...
[i]t overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates on substantial truth .... Our defini-
tion of actual malice relies upon this historical understanding." Masson, 111 S. Ct. at
2432-33 (citations omitted). The Court then "conclude[d] that a deliberate alteration of
the words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity for purposes of
New York Times ... unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning
conveyed by the statement." Id. at 2433 (citation omitted). Prior to this ruling, "substan-
tial truth" was strictly a common law doctrine. In all the defamation cases to reach the
Supreme Court between its decisions in New York Times and Masson, the court used the
term "substantial truth" only once, and then it noted explicitly that this was a common law
doctrine. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 137 (1967) ("[T]he only de-
fense raised by petitioner Curtis was one of substantial truth. No constitutional defenses
were interposed . . ").
65. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2432.
66. Id. at 2431.
67. Id. at 2431-32. Justices White and Scalia dissented from the Court's analysis,
arguing that in such circumstances journalists could avoid liability by paraphrasing rather
than quoting their subject. Id. at 2438 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For further discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 221-22.
1282 [Vol. 41:1271
FICTIONALIZED QUOTATIONS
spoken would have to be altered in order to preserve the speaker's
meaning, such as when one misspeaks.6 8 The court concluded that
an alteration that preserves the material meaning causes "no in-
jury to reputation that is compensable as a defamation."69
This reasoning, however, is misdirected. Whether the altera-
tion is a defamation-that is, tends to injure one's reputa-
tion--cannot be determined by examining whether the alteration
is false.70 This is the point of Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, the in-
quiry should focus on whether the alteration increased the defam-
atory impact of the statement.71 Masson instead focuses on
whether the alteration effects a material change in the meaning.
Being representative of the community, juries seem well-equipped
to determine whether one statement has a greater tendency to
harm a plaintiff's reputation in the community than does another
statement. However, juries, or any other body for that matter, do
not appear well-equipped to determine whether one statement has
a materially different meaning than another.72
The Supreme Court rejected the second component of the
Ninth Circuit's formulation of the essence rule, that a defendant
could not be held liable for publishing a rational interpretation of
an ambiguous statement. The Court based this ruling on its deter-
mination that a rational interpretation standard would allow jour-
nalists to put words in the mouths of their subjects, diminish the
trustworthiness of the printed word, and cause subjects to be less
willing to speak to the press, all of which "ill-serve[s] the values of
68. Masson, II I S. Ct. at 2432.
69. Id.
70. Justice White made exactly this point. See id. at 2438 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
71. 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1977).
72, The Masson opinion itself is illustrative. The Court upheld summary judgment
as to the alteration of the quote regarding the change in Masson's middle name. On tape
Masson explained that his grandfather changed the family name from Moussaieff to Mas-
son "to hide his Jewishness." Id. at 2426. Masson stated that he initially changed his last
name back to Moussaieff, but when his wife objected, he used it as a middle name. He
explained the change, saying "It was sort of part of analysis: a return to the roots, and your
family tradition and so on" and that he "just liked it." Id. The article, however, explained
that Moussaieff was the traditional family name and then quoted Masson as saying that he
changed his middle name because the family name "sounded better." Id. To say Masson
adopted Moussaieff because he liked it might indicate an affinity for his heritage, as if to
say, "I liked it because it is the family name," while to say it sounded better might indicate
an indifference toward this heritage. Such an alteration might be considered to convey a
materially different meaning. The Court offered no explanation for its conclusion that the
statements are materially identical in meaning. See id. at 2436.
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the First Amendment. '7'  The Court did not address itself to
whether its substantial truth formulation of the essence rule would
have any tendency toward these ills.
The Supreme Court has thus adopted a substantial truth for-
mulation of the essence rule. However, it is not clear that this rule
is more consistent with first amendment values than the literal
rule, much less that it is constitutionally compelled. Consideration
of this issue is the focus of the remainder of the analysis.
II. ETHICAL CONVENTIONS IN JOURNALISM
The various canons of journalistic ethics shed some light on
the practice of altering quotations. 4 While journalists' ethical
treatment of this issue is not determinative,7 5 the accepted stan-
dards of professional conduct ought to be persuasive in the proper
formulation of a legal rule. At the very least, the legal rule
adopted should not be inconsistent with professional canons. 76
The ethics of journalism are grounded in the role of the press
in society. The function of the press stems from the social contract
existing between the press and the public.7 According to this con-
tract, "[s]ociety seems to promise the press freedom to function
73. Id. at 2434.
74. Cf., AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
Article IV (1975) ("Every effort must be made to assure that the news content is accurate,
free from bias and in context, and that all sides are presented fairly."); ASSOCIATED PRESS
MANAGING EDITORS ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETHICS (1975) ("The newspaper should guard
against inaccuracies, carelessness, bias or distortion through either emphasis or omission.");
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, SIGMA DELTA CHI, CODE OF ETHIcs (1973)
("There is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of thoroughness.").
75. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1562 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("The standards and aspirations of the profession are not, of
course, dispositive ...."), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991). But cf. Home v. Patton, 291
Ala. 701, 708, 287 So. 2d 824, 829 (1974) (court looked to the Principles of Medical
Ethics promulgated by the American Medical Association as some authority for its holding
that a physician's violation of the ethical obligation not to disclose a patient's medical in-
formation can be an actionable invasion of privacy).
76. In recognition of this principle, Judge Kozinski's dissent in Masson includes a
review of journalistic ethics. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1558-62 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Failure to use verbatim quotes is acceptable when correcting grammar and word usage. It
is more controversial, however, to deliberately improve statements by the speaker, such as
fixing "false starts, rambling and imcomplete sentences." Id. at 1559. Likewise, it is con-
troversial "to vary or rearrange the facts of a story in order to advance a literary purpose."
Id. Neither the Supreme Court's majority nor its dissent surveyed conventions of journalis-
tic ethics.
77. See Hodges, Defining Press Responsibility: A Functional Approach, in RESPON-
SIBLE JOURNALISM 19 (D. Elliott ed. 1986) (discussing the socially contracted responsibili-
ties of the press).
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with the assumption that the press will serve society's needs for
information and opinion."178 The contractual obligations conferred
on the press, as presently construed,7 9 fall into two primary cate-
gories: the political 'watchdog' function and the educational
function.80
Under the political watchdog function, the public "'send[s]'
journalists to watch the government on [the public's] behalf."81
Because individuals cannot personally monitor the actions of pub-
lic officials, the political watchdog function is a prerequisite to
democratic government. The press, by performing this role, allows
citizens to respond to government abuses of power without having
to discover the abuses independently. In addition, a vigilant press
deters those officials who might abuse the power of government if
the watchful eye of the press were not upon them. 2
Under the rubric of education, the press promotes two core
interests of the first amendment: the search for truth and self-gov-
ernment.8 3 The press advances the search for truth by reporting
the entire spectrum of perspectives and opinion. This unfettered
exchange of ideas eventually yields truth.84 In addition to the
"search for truth," the press makes self-government possible. It
has been explained that "[p]ublic discussion is the only viable way
of refining and disseminating our thoughts on [truth,] and the re-
finement and dissemination of such matters is an absolute precon-
dition for wise public policy in a democratic state."8 5 In other
words, the press disseminates information to the public in order
for the public to make decisions that are necessary for effective
78. Id.
79. The specific needs of society to be met by the press "must be worked out infor-
mally on a continuing basis between specific press organizations and their audiences." Id.
at 19.
80. Id. at 21, 22-24. Hodges states that the press is responsible for performing four
functions: political, educational, utility and cultural. Under the utility function, the press
"operates as the society's 'bulletin board.'" Id. at 21. Under its cultural function, the press
"holds up a mirror to society and reflects the kind of people we are." Id. This note, how-
ever, examines only the press's political and educational functions.
81. Id. at 22.
82. Id.
83. These theories are discussed fully infra text accompanying notes 125-78.
84. Hedges, supra note 77, at 24-25 ("No activity, in short, is as likely to unseat
false opinion as an unfettered encounter with truer ones.") (citing J. MILL, On Liberty, in
UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 108 (1951)); see also J.
MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 11 (J. Suffolk ed. 1968) (arguing that the best means of attaining
truth is an unfettered exchange bf ideas).
85. Hodges, supra note 77, at 24.
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self-government.
Thus, the press, having been assigned watchdog and educa-
tional functions, is a necessary vehicle for achieving the core inter-
ests of the first amendment. Though there is concern as to the
effectiveness of the press in meeting the first amendment's core
interests,86 this concern does not diminish the need for journalistic
ethics to ensure that the public's trust has not been misplaced.
Public trust is one of the foundations of journalistic ethics.
"'The media need not ever be loved or even fully understood to
carry out their function in society. But they must be trusted if
they are to be credible in their watchdog role over the govern-
ment, which has the power-with public backing-to restrict
press freedom.' ",87 Although observers differ as to the extent to
which alarm is justified, there is substantial evidence of public dis-
trust of the media.88 Since the press requires public trust to per-
form its role in society, journalistic ethics must be aimed at main-
taining this trust.
An ethical rule that preserves society's trust must be based on
an understanding of how the public absorbs the information and
opinions offered by the press. A particularly helpful construction
is the "reasonable reader" standard.89 This standard explicitly
draws on the legal reasonable person standard and "is designed to
incorporate the common body of assumptions that the members of
a society make about their fellow citizens." 90
In the context of quotations, "most people assume that quota-
tion marks do indicate exact renderings." 91 The "reasonable
reader" standard suggests that quotation marks should only be
placed around the exact, unaltered words of the source.
86. But see id. at 25 ("No other institutions on the horizon can meet the need as
effectively and efficiently.").
87. S. KLAIDMAN & T. BEAUCHAMP, THE VIRTUOUS JOURNALIST 154 (1987) (quot-
ing SIGMA DELTA CHI, SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, WHITE PAPER OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC OPINION 12 (1984)).
88. See id. at 158 (Seventy-five percent of all adults have some reservations about
the credibility of the media and twenty percent harbor deep distrust).
89. Id. at 32-34. The Supreme Court adopted this standard in Masson, but in a
different context. The court recognized that quotation marks may be put to uses other than
indicating an actual quotation. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419,
2430-31 (1991). For example, quotation marks might indicate that a word is used in other
than its usual sense, or that the words are part of a hypothetical conversation. Therefore,
the court ruled that whether quotation marks indicate an actual quotation is to be deter-
mined by reference to the reasonable reader. Id.
90. Id. at 32.
91. J. OLEN, ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 98-99 (1988).
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Furthermore, it has been noted that "trust is based on the
expectation that persons, institutions, and so on will act as antici-
pated.""2 This coincides with the expectation under the "reasona-
ble reader" standard that quotations contain the exact words of
the speaker. The commitment to preserving the public trust is
therefore inextricably tied to the "reasonable reader" standard. If
journalistic ethics fail to demand that quotation marks surround
only the exact words of the speaker, then the public trust underly-
ing the social contract will be severely eroded.
It seems to be universally accepted that quotation marks are
only to be used when they surround the words of the speaker,
transcribed verbatim. 93 It is widely admitted, however, that pre-
cise transcription of every quotation is not possible.94 Thus, it
could be contended that an ethical requirement of verbatim quota-
tion is unrealistic and unreasonable. 95 This contention, however, is
not persuasive. Journalists who take notes of speeches or inter-
views but fail to transcribe the words fully or precisely are not
ethically culpable.96 This concession sheds no light on the culpa-
92. Id. at 155.
93. See J. CHANCELLOR & W. MEARS, THE NEWS BUSINESS 98 (1983) (It is not the
newswriter's duty to paraphrase or correct the speaker. The newswriter's duty is to quote
the speaker accurately); M. CHARNLEY & B. CHARNLEY, supra note 6, at 248 ("Quotation
marks mean literally that the words they enclose are exactly as the source gave them -
verbatim."); N. CRAwFoRD, THE ETHICS OF JOURNALISM 217 (1924J (Employees of the
Springfield (Mass.) Republican were reminded, "[w]hen people are quoted, the paper is
placed in the position of assuring its readers that the quoted passages were literally spoken;
consequently, inaccuracy in quotation is unpardonable."); J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S
MOTIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEWS MEDIA 70 (1976) ("Most of the newspaper
codes or canons tend to stress literal accuracy when quoting news sources."); J. OLEN,
supra note 91, at 98 ("All of us have learned that quotation marks should be reserved for
exact quotes only."); UNIVERSiTY OF CHICAGO PRESS, THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE
§10.6, at 283 (13th ed. 1982) ("direct quotations must reproduce exactly . . . the word-
ing" (emphasis in original)); cf. P. MEYER, ETHICAL JOURNALISM 59 (1987) (noting as
further support for verbatim quotations that "the choice is not between fictionalizing and
forgoing the conveyance of certain kinds of insights to the reader"). It could be argued that
a less rigid rule would suffice in situations involving altered quotations attributed to un-
named or non-existent sources. J. OLEN, supra note 91, at 101 (It is acceptable practice for
reporters to attribute their own opinion to unnamed or non-existent sources.).
94. See J. HULTENG, supra note 93, at 70 ("[A]s a practical matter, it is not always
possible for a reporter to be so literally accurate, unless there is a prepared manuscript, a
trial transcript, or a tape recording to turn to.").
95. See S. KLAIDMAN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 87, at 20 ("[T]he standard of
moral scrutiny must not be so high that the expectations for conduct are that the journalist
be heroic or saintly.... [E]thics for journalism must be within reach of ordinary
persons.").
96. See, e.g., J. HULTENG, supra note 93, at 70-71 ("Even if every syllable hasn't
been captured as uttered, even if every article isn't exactly in place, the quote can still be
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bility of one who, after painstakingly obtaining a verbatim tran-
scription, deliberately alters it. Indeed, those commentators who
assert that verbatim quotations are an unobtainable ideal never-
theless condemn the practice of intentionally altering quotations.9 7
It might also be argued that the practice of "cleaning up"
quotations supports the rejection of an ethical requirement that
quotes be verbatim. "Cleaning up" quotations entails correcting
grammatical and syntactical errors and removing "false starts"
("ums" and "ers"). Some commentators find this practice accept-
able.98 However, the majority of commentators reject this
practice.9"
Even accepting its propriety, changing tense or deleting an
"urn" is substantially different than changing the words used by
the speaker. Even if considered false, a cleansed quotation does
not alter the defamatory impact of the original statement, and,
under Hotchner, cannot be held defamatory. 00
The most recent challenge to the settled ethical principle that
quotations be verbatim has been mounted by the new journalism
movement.' 0 ' New journalism is an aberrant strain within the pro-
considered an acceptably accurate one if it honestly reflects what the speaker said."). Nor
would they be legally culpable. Under the literal rule, there would be a false statement of
fact, but actual malice would be absent. Even if the plaintiff is a private figure invoking a
negligence standard, it is doubtful that the journalist's error would be sufficient to support
a finding of this reduced level of culpability.
Under the essence rule, there would be no false statement and thus no liability, as long
as the attributed statement does not alter the substantive content of the actual statement.
If the writer's error failed to preserve the essence of the original statement it would consti-
tute a false statement of fact, but, as discussed supra, the culpability element still must be
proven. Only under the Ninth Circuit's formulation would a finding of falsity alone support
an inference of actual malice.
97. Compare, e.g., J. HULTENG, supra note 93 (recognizing that literal accuracy is
impractical, but maintaining that the speaker's intent must remain intact), with J.
HULTENG, PLAYING IT STRAIGHT: A PRACTICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS 64 (1981) ("It is never justifiable for
a journalist to make up quotations, however plausible or characteristic, or to edit a source's
comments so that their thrust or meaning is altered in any way.").
98. See J. OLEN, supra note 91, at 100 ("Not to clean up quotes is to make intelli-
gent speakers look stupid and stupid speakers look stupider.").
99. See, e.g., J. CHANCELLOR & W. MEARS, supra note 93, at 98 (condemning
practice of "cleaning up" quotations even where the alteration is merely to correct verb
tense); J. HULTENG, supra note 93, at 72 (cleaning up quotations is not sound practice).
100. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.), (liability will be im-
posed only when an alteration "increase[s] the defamatory impact of" the actual state-
ment), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977). For a discussion of Hotchner, see supra text
accompanying notes 27-35.
101. See generally E. DENNIS & W. RIVERS, OTHER VOICES: THE NEW JOURNALISM
IN AMERICA 5 (1974) (New journalists take an interpretive rather than objective approach
1288 [Vol. 41:1271
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fession. 012 Traditionally, journalists strive to convey their factual
knowledge of an event, leaving the job of understanding to the
reader.10 3 New journalists reject these distinctions,104 instead, con-
veying to the readers their own perceptions of truth.
New journalists argue that "facts" are only a part of the
larger "truth" of an event. This school emphasizes that every
statement and every event has a meaning beyond its attendant
"facts." 105 In light of this principle, the new journalists have an
avowed willingness to sacrifice "facts" to get at the larger truth.
Time, place, and identity are all subject to alteration in order to
illuminate the larger truth as perceived by the individual journal-
ist. 0 8 In the context of quotations, the words used by the speaker
are facts,* while the "meaning" of those words constitutes the
larger "truth" of the statement.10 7 To cast it in terms of an event
rather than a remark, "to know what happened is to know the
facts, but to understand what happened is to grasp the truth."108
In spite of the manifest correctness of the new journalists'
assertion that events involve larger truths, the validity of their
practice of subverting facts in order to ascertain the larger truth
must be analyzed in light of the function of the press. 0 9 The press
facilitates self-government by providing the citizenry with facts
necessary for making decisions about public affairs. New journal-
ism interferes with the role of the citizenry in self-government by
failing to inform readers of the accuracy of their articles, thereby
passing off fiction as fact."x0 The effect of the new journalism,
then, is to substitute the judgment of the press for the judgment of
to reporting, focusing on the "[c]olor, flavor, atmosphere, the ultimate human meaning,
rather than the facts.").
102. See, e.g., P. MEYER, supra note 93, at 56-60 (discussing the limited number of
reporters who have adopted this approach, many of whom have written "themselves right
out of the newspaper business." Id. at 57).
103. To do otherwise subverts those interests that the press is intended to advance.
See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
104. See E. DEams & W. RiVERS, supra note 101, at 1 (In a general way, new
journalism can be defined as "dissatisfaction with existing standards and values.").
105. See id. at 4 ("The best objective report may cover all the surfaces of an event,
the best interpretive report may explain all its meanings, but both are bloodless, a world
away from the experience.").
106. See, e.g., P. MEYER, supra 'note 93, at 56-60 (offering examples of new
journalism).
107. J. OLEN, supra note 91, at 83.
108. Id. at 83 (emphasis in original).
109. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
110. P. MEYER, supra note 93, at 56.
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the public.""
Despite the existence of new journalism and the debate re-
garding the cleaning up of quotations, the ethical obligation to
render verbatim quotations remains well-settled and consistent
with the role of the press in society." 2 It does not follow, however,
that this ethical principle should be adopted as a matter of law."'
There is an important distinction to be drawn between press re-
sponsibility and press accountability. Responsibility pertains to
what a journalist should do, while accountability pertains to what
a journalist may be compelled to do." 4 Although many commen-
tators agree that there is a responsibility to render verbatim quo-
tations," 5 few are willing to impose legal accountability for a fail-
ure to adhere to this standard."' A principle argument against
imposing legal accountability on the press is premised upon con-
clusory statements that the first amendment prohibits such a
course of action." 7 Whether the imposition of legal accountability
is consistent with the first amendment is a legal question to be
resolved within the framework laid down by the courts. It is that
framework which will now be examined.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS FOR ALTERED QUOTATIONS
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"" and subsequent cases,
the Supreme Court has established an analytical framework to de-
termine the standards that are constitutionally appropriate in is-
sues of first impression. Whether it was proper for the Masson
Court to adopt a substantial truth formulation of the essence rule
111. New journalism may have other adverse consequences. In order for the press to
adequately perform its function, it must have the trust of the public. See supra text accom-
panying notes 86-88. The inaccuracies of new journalism are apt to erode this trust.
112. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying' text.
113. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Scope [6] ("Violation of a Rule
should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal
duty has been breached.").
114. See Hodges, supra note 77, at 13-15.
115. See supra note 93.
116. See Hodges, supra note 77, at 15 ("Democracy demands a fiercely independent
press, especially one free from accountability to government. . . . Although there is good
reason for the press to be wary, defensive, and resistant about matters of accountability,
there is no reason for the same wariness about responsibility.").
117. See, e.g., Merrill, Three Theories of Press Responsibility and the Advantages
of Pluralistic Individualism, in RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM 47 (1986) (Legal accountability
"would seem to be a direct affront to the First Amendment; therefore . . . it has to be set
aside.").
118. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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should be determined by reference to this framework.
When confronting unresolved issues of law in the defamation
context, courts have consistently derived legal rules by accommo-
dating the constitutionally recognized interests implicated by the
unresolved issue.119 Under the rubric of constitutionally recog-
nized interests, two categories are recognized: first amendment ex-
pression interests and reputational interests.12 The first amend-
ment expression interest itself implicates the social interest 12' in
self-government,122 the social interest in the search for truth,123
and the individual interest in self-fulfillment.'24 Thus, the rule ul-
timately selected must accommodate the first amendment's social
and individual interests as well as the more general constitutional
interest in protecting reputation.
119. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
757 (1985) ("To make this determination, we must . . . balance the State's interest in
compensating. . . individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment
interest in protecting . . . expression."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-
345 (1974) (accommodating both the first amendment interest of avoiding self-censorship
and the constitutional interest in protecting one's reputation); New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (need to accommodate those interests mentioned in Gertz was
implicit in the Court's rejection of Justice Black's contention that the first amendment
stands as an absolute bar to defamation actions); Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (in fashioning a rule the court must accommodate the "inter-
ests in free expression. . . and in an individual's reputation"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985), overruled on other grounds, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695
(1990). Prior to New York Times, however, the Court had consistently regarded defama-
tion claims as beyond the scope of first amendment protection. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include . . . [defamation].") (footnote
omitted).
120. The Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), rec-
ognized reputation as a constitutional interest. The Court held that although the constitu-
tional scheme left the protection of reputation largely to the states, "'this does not mean
that the right [to protection of one's reputation] is entitled to any less recognition by this
Court as a basic of our constitutional system.'" Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (quoting Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
121. The choice between the essence rule and the literal rule does not entail the
potential for repression of speech to such an extent that social unrest becomes a reasonable
concern. As such, this question does not implicate the "social safety valve" theory of the
first amendment. For a discussion of this theory, see T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FiRsT AMENDMENT 11-14 (1967).
122. See id. at 8-11.
123. See id. at 7-8.
124. See id. at 4-7.
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A. The Social Theories of the First Amendment
The social theories of the first amendment, self-government
and the search for truth, are substantially similar. Each theory
regards the first amendment as a means of achieving a greater
social benefit. Both theories hold that speech should be protected,
not because of the need to safeguard an individual's right to
speak, but to protect society's need to hear. It is in this sense that
self-government and the search for truth are social theories vindi-
cating social interests.
The self-government theory is generally attributed to Alexan-
der Meiklejohn. 125 According to this theory the purpose of the
first amendment is to enable citizens to govern themselves. 2 That
is, "'[t]he people, not the government, possess the absolute sover-
eignty.' ,127 The prerequisite to effective self-governance is that
citizens make informed decisions. For the citizenry to govern itself
effectively, it must have access to all information and opinions.,2,
Stated alternatively, access to all relevant information 2 is a pre-
requisite to self-government.
Under the self-government theory, the first amendment facili-
tates the establishment of a forum in which debate of public is-
suesi s° and dissemination of necessary information is possible.'
125. See, e.g., Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Cm. L.
REv. 782, 782 (1986) (calling Meiklejohn "the father of modem first amendment theory").
126. "Under the compact upon which the Constitution rests, it is agreed that men
shall not be governed by others, that they shall govern themselves." A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 89 (1948).
127. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964) (quoting James
Madison from his report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1795).
128. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 126, at 88 ("[E]ssential, if men are to be their own
rulers, is the demand that whatever truth may become available shall be placed at the
disposal of all the citizens of the community.").
129. Acceptance of the view that the first amendment embodies the advancement of
self-government creates the problem of determining what information is truly necessary to
the political decision-making process. Meiklejohn defines the scope of information neces-
sary for political decision-making broadly. "The freedom of mind which befits the members
of a self-governing society is not a given and fixed part of human nature. It can be in-
creased and established by learning, by teaching, by the unhindered flow of accurate infor-
mation, by giving men health and vigor and security ...." A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 19 (1965).
130. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270 (There is "a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open.").
131. Alexander Meiklejohn argued forcefully that public dissemination of informa-
tion is the true function of the first amendment:
It's purpose is to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest
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The first amendment interest vindicated under this theory is "the
successful operation of the political process."1 32 Because the politi-
cal process is the relevant first amendment interest, the purpose
underlying the protection of speech is not the individual right to
express one's self; instead, it is the right, even the need, of the
public to hear all relevant information.133 Meiklejohn uses the
"traditional American town meeting" model as an illustration of
the self-government theory of the first amendment.1 34 Every per-
son can attend the meeting and, once there, has a right and even a
duty to formulate their own views, to communicate those views,
and to hear the views of others.13 5 The second social interest of the
first amendment, the search for truth, is similar in rationale to the
self-government theory. The search for truth theory holds that
truth in all matters-political, scientific, moral, artistic and so
on-is best attained by hearing all ideas and arguments and then
determining the most rational conclusion. The truth-finding pro-
cess must be maintained in order to assure that the truth is not
suppressed in favor of irrational beliefs. The role of the first
amendment in this context is to ensure that ideas and arguments
are widely available to facilitate the public's continual reassess-
ment of its beliefs. 3 6
The model for this theory is generally referred to as the mar-
ketplace of ideas. All ideas are allowed to compete with one an-
other and ultimately, it is hypothesized, the truth will prevail. The
concept is similar to the market for goods wherein the most effi-
cient producer, when allowed to compete freely and fairly, prevails
over inefficient producers. 13 7
possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which the citi-
zens of a self-governing society must deal. When a free man is voting, it is not
enough that the truth is known by someone else. . . .The voters must have it,
all of them.
A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 126, at 88.
132. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 62 (1975).
133. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 126, at 66 ("We listen, not because [we] desire to
speak, but because we need to hear.").
134. Id. at 22.
135. Id.
136. See T. EMERSON, supra note 121, at 7 ("[T]he soundest and most rational judg-
ment is arrived at by considering all facts and arguments which can be put forth in behalf
of or against any proposition. Human judgment is a frail thing.. . . It can seldom rest at
the point any single person carries it, but must always remain incomplete and subject to
further extension, refinement, rejection or modification.").
137. This concept has deep roots in Anglo-American tradition. See generally J.
MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1-13 (1951)
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The search for truth theory views the first amendment instru-
mental to advancing truth, morality, science, and the arts138
through the largely uninhibited dissemination of information and
opinion. Likewise, the self-government theory views the first
amendment as instrumental to decision making through liberal
dissemination of information and opinion. For the purposes of the
issue at hand, self-government is simply the political branch of the
search for truth.3 9 Conversely, the attainment of truth may be
viewed as a necessary component of democratic self-govern-
ment. 140 Under either articulation, these theories are sufficiently
enmeshed that they may be considered together. The issue of
which rule, literal or essence, is more appropriate, lies within the
intersection of these theories.
Each of these social theories imposes the same requirement
on the law of defamation: avoidance of self-censorship.14' How-
ever, the Court has held that speech may be restricted where free
speech stands as an impediment to the achievement of the social
interests embodied in the first amendment. 142 Avoidance of self-
censorship supports adoption of the essence rule because it de-
mands less precision from publishers. On the other hand, the at-
tainment of truth, including political truth, may recommend the
(free exchange of ideas is essential to prevent tyranny); J. MILTON, supra note 84, at 68
("[A]1l opinions, yea errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service and assistance
toward the speedy attainment of what is truest."). Justice Holmes was the first on the
bench to offer the search for truth as a theory of the first amendment in his dissent in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.
Id. at 630.
138. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967).
139. In Butts, the Court recognized the interrelationship of the self-government and
search for truth theories when it held that political expression is not the sole foundation of
the first amendment guaranties. Id. Professor Nimmer has also classified self-government
as a subset of the search for truth. See M. NMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 1.02[H] (1991).
140. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965) (discussing freedom of speech in the context of political
freedom).
141. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
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literal rule. 4 Weighing these conflicting considerations requires a
fuller examination of the case law.
The Supreme Court's most notable reliance on the social the-
ories appears in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' The Court
recognized that vindication of the social interests embodied in the
first amendment, effective self-government and the attainment of
truth, requires a forum in which all information and opinion is
expressed and disseminated to the public. 145 Consistent with this
notion, the Court found "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open."' 146  Thus, the New York Times Court
adopted the social theories view of the first amendment as provid-
ing a forum for such a debate.
In order to engender a free and open public debate, the first
amendment requires that self-censorship be avoided. 147 One ra-
tionale behind this rule is that the "[f]ear of guessing wrong
[about a statement's truth] must inevitably cause self-censorship
and thus create the danger that [a] legitimate utterance will be
deterred.1 48 Maintaining a robust public debate requires the
court "to tip [the scales] in favor of protecting true speech."' 49
Thus, in choosing between the literal rule and the essence rule, the
court must consider the "chilling effect" each rule may have on
the withholding of information from the public.
143. The Supreme Court failed to consider this possibility when it adopted the sub-
stantial truth formulation of the essence rule. See supra text accompanying note 73.
144. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
145. The Court stated:
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Repub-
lic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.
Id. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
146. Id. at 270.
147. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("Although the
erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless
inevitable in free debate . . . .And punishment of error runs the risk of inducing...
intolerable self-censorship."); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (arguing that even if a
defense of truth is established, the burden and expense of having to prove the truth will
execute a self-censorship which "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate").
148. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971); see New York Times,
376 U.S. at 279 ("A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of
all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in
amount-leads to a comparable 'self-censorship.' ").
149. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
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The literal rule would protect only verbatim renderings of the
speaker's statement.150 Despite the fact that the plaintiff is still
required to show the requisite culpability, the ease with which fal-
sity is shown would arguably have "a chilling effect" on publish-
ers. Adoption of the essence rule would have the advantage of
minimizing the "chilling effect" because, as discussed previ-
ously,151 this rule grants publishers wider latitude in altering quo-
tations without incurring legal liability. The essence rule protects
both exact renderings and deviations that preserve the substantive
content of the statement. 152 Because the essence rule affords pub-
lishers greater protection,' 3 publishers are less likely to be "chil-
led" by the fear of either not satisfactorily proving their render-
ings true or incurring the expense of doing so.'54
The weakness of the argument that first amendment interests
in avoiding self-censorship favors the use of the essence rule, how-
ever, is exposed when one examines the actual censorship avoided
by this rule. Here, as opposed to the context of New York Times,
the self-censorship will not entail a withholding of information
from public discourse but rather a withholding of quotation
marks. That is, rather than enclosing a statement in quotation
marks, the "chilled" publisher will merely paraphrase the speaker.
While the contrast between a statement and silence seems
150. Under the literal rule the misquotation would be considered false, thereby sup-
porting a libel claim. The plaintiff would still be required to convince a jury that there was
a deviation from the words actually spoken, that the deviation was material, that the devia-
tion was defamatory, and that the defendant acted with the requisite degree of culpability,
in this instance actual malice. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535,
1562 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
151. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
152. This is true of both the Ninth Circuit's formulation, see Masson, 895 F.2d at
1562, and the Supreme Court's formulation, see Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2433.
153. In Masson, the plaintiff, a public figure, was the subject of an article published
by the defendants. The author conducted several interviews with the defendant. These in-
terviews were recorded on audio tape. For a discussion of the recorded conversations, see
supra note 20. The article quoted Masson as asserting that others regarded him as an
"intellectual gigolo." The tapes do not reveal this statement and, for the purposes of ruling
on summary judgment, the court assumed that it was never made. Nevertheless, the court
found that the essence of this statement was sufficiently similar to his actual statement that
his employers considered him to be "a private asset but a public liability." Masson, 895
F.2d at 1541. It is reasonable to conclude that such a broad protection as that afforded by
the Ninth Circuit's formulation of the essence rule would encourage the press to be robust
and unfettered in quoting its subjects.
154. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (the "chilling effect" is minimized by
adopting a rule which avoids creating "doubt [that truth] can be proved in court or fear of
the expense of having to do so.").
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more significant than that between a quotation and paraphrase,
both entail a loss of information. The statement enclosed in quota-
tion marks conveys the same message as a substantially identical
statement that is not so enclosed. However, the quotation also
reveals to the reader something about the speaker to whom the
statement is attributed that the paraphrase does not.155 The loss of
this information is potentially relevant to the citizen in assessing
the strength of various viewpoints. This self-censorship causes the
public to lose information, thereby undermining the first amend-
ment's role in vindicating relevant social interests.1 5
Although the essence rule stands in contradiction to the con-
vention "that quotation marks do indicate exact renderings,' 57 it
might be said that this rule merely requires the public to become
more skeptical.158 The social theories of the first amendment place
substantial responsibilities on the public. These theories require
active, alert participation of the public in the forum created by the
first amendment and require the public to listen with an appropri-
ately skeptical ear.'59 Although considerations of skepticism do
not compel the adoption of a particular rule, the assumption that
155. See J. MILTON, supra note 84, at 48-50 (One's expressions "contain a potency
of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are."); Masson, 895
F.2d at 1549 (Kozinska, J., dissenting) (Through a quotation a person's "'own words reveal
[a] psychological profile-a self-portrait.'" (quoting Coles, Freudianism Confronts its
Malcontents, Boston Globe, May 27, 1984, at 58, 60, col. 2)).
156. See Masson, 11I S. Ct. at 2430 ("Quotations allow the reader to form his or
her own conclusions, and to assess the conclusions of the author, instead of relying entirely
on the author's characterization of her subject.").
157. J. OLEN, supra note 91, at 98-99.
158. Some commentators argue that considerations of skepticism support the adop-
tion of a rule that requires greater alertness on the part of the public. See Skolnick, Fore-
word: The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 CALIF. L. Rv. 677, 681-82 (1986) (imply-
ing that the court should adopt those rules which cultivate an appropriate degree of
skepticism in the public).
159. Meiklejohn posed the challenge thusly:
Do we the people of the United States wish to be thus mentally "pro-
tected" 9 To say that would seem to be an admission that we are intellectually
and morally unfit to play our part in what Justice Holmes has called the experi-
ment of self-government. Have we, on that ground, abandoned or qualified the
great experiment?
A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 126, xiii-xiv. Meiklejohn ultimately concluded that we have
not abandoned the "experiment," and modern first amendment jurisprudence bears him.
out. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing that public discourse is a duty);
cf. Skolnick, supra note 149, at 681 (rather than seeking a governmental warranty of truth,
the public is best served by being skeptical and concluding for itself whether a statement is
true).
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the public is skeptical, which underlies the social theories, demon-
strates that the mere incongruence of the essence rule with a pub-
lic perception is not itself sufficient reason to reject the essence
rule.
Yet the first amendment's manifest interest in the avoidance
of self-censorship is by no means unqualified.' Justice Black, in
his concurrence in New York Times, argued that the Constitution
"completely prohibit[s] a State from exercising [the] power . . .
to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials
against critics of their official conduct."' 6 ' This construction was
rejected by a majority of the Court. 62  Despite the fact that its
holding would cause greater self-censorship than Black's formula-
tion, the Court implicitly recognized that some speech is not pro-
tected by the first amendment.'63
Underlying the Court's reasoning is the notion that the first
amendment must be interpreted so as to advance the social inter-
ests it embodies.'6 4 In its opinion in New York Times, the Court
160. It has been observed that "[a]ccountability, like subjection to law, is not neces-
sarily a net subtraction from liberty." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 399
(1974) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE
AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 130 (1947)).
161. 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 281-82.
163. In New York Times, the Court held that knowingly published false speech lies
beyond first amendment protection. Id. at 280. The Gertz Court asserted that this was the
underlying rationale of New York Times, noting that "[t]he need to avoid self-censorship
by the news media is . . not the only societal value at issue. If it were, this Court would
have embraced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional
and indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
164. Even Milton recognized this point. He asserted, "[flor who knows not that
Truth is strong next to the Almighty; she needs no policies, no stratagems, no licensing to
make her victorious." J. MILTON, supra note 84, at 128. Milton was quick to qualify this
statement, however, indicating that notions which undermine the integrity of the debate
should be excluded: "I mean not tolerated Popery, and open superstition, which as it extir-
pates all religions and civil supremacies, so itself should be extirpate. ... Id. at 130. See
Epstein, supra note 125, at 799 ("A belief in markets for ordinary goods requires govern-
ment protection (funded by taxes) against theft and fraud. A belief in the marketplace of
ideas requires the same protection.").
The self-government theory also supports this argument. In the town meeting model,
discussed supra at text accompanying notes 134-35, Meiklejohn recognizes that some
abridgement of speech is necessary to allow the meeting to take place and some speech
may ultimately be subverted to insure wise political decision making. For example, speak-
ers may be required to adhere to rules of order, and if they transgress, they may be cen-
sored. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 126, at 23 ("The meeting has assembled not primarily
to talk, but primarily by means of getting business done. And the talking must be regulated
and abridged as the doing of business under actual conditions may require."). The abridge-
ment of speech permitted in a town meeting is roughly analogous to that permitted by the
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indicated that there might be some value to false speech.1 6 5 How-
ever, this argument has been repeatedly rejected in subsequent
cases, 166 based in part on the recognition that truth may need poli-
cies or stratagems "to make her victorious. ' 167 As the Court
stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., "an opportunity for rebuttal
seldom suffices to undo [the] harm of [a] defamatory falsehood.
Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the
truth rarely catches up with a lie."168
For truth to be at a "competitive disadvantage" with false-
hood is inconsistent with the social theories of the first amendment
and the expansive protection they extend to the press.169 To the
first amendment. Id. at 23-24. Thus, speech that impedes wise political decision making is
inconsistent with the self-government interest of the first amendment and must be sub-
verted to this interest. False speech has "no constitutional value," Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974), and to the extent that it is an impediment to self-govern-
ment it has negative constitutional value in the social context. The first amendment interest
in effective self-government requires that such negative influences be removed. See A.
BICKEL, supra note 132, at 62-63 ("[T]he First Amendment should protect and indeed
encourage speech so long as it serves to make the political process work. . . but not when
it amounts to an effort to supplant, disrupt, or coerce the process .... ").
These principles have led courts to enjoin speech that would impede the political pro-
cess. See, e.g., Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The Tomei court
enjoined a municipal committee affiliated with the Democratic Party from using or distrib-
uting literature bearing a name that the court found would mislead the public into believ-
ing its candidates were affiliated with and endorsed by the Republican party. The court
held, "the First Amendment goal [of] . . . '[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral pro-
cess, preventing corruption, and "sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the individ-
ual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government" are interests of highest
importance.'" Id. at 698 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
788-89 (1978) (quoting United States v. U.A.W., 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957))). However,
courts have generally been reluctant to enjoin speech. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that compulsion to speak may be as violative
of the first amendment as prohibitions on speech); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, (1966)
(holding that "no test of reasonableness [could] save a state law from invalidation as a
violation of the First Amendment when that law makes it a crime for a newspaper editor to
do no more than urge people to vote one way or another in a publicly held election[]"). But
see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of the F.C.C.'s "fairness doctrine" requiring that both sides of public issues be
given fair coverage because of limited frequencies available for broadcasting).
165. 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 ("Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valua-
ble contribution to public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.' ").
166. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (renouncing
the notion that false statements might have constitutional value but also cautioning against
overdeterrence); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) ("[n]either lies nor
false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment").
167. But see supra note 164.
168. 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974).
169. "[T]rust in the operation of the marketplace [of ideas] implies a trust that the
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extent that truth is handicapped in its competition with falsity, the
commitment to finding the truth under the first amendment re-
quires that the scales be tipped to favor truth. Thus, the Gertz
Court, aware that its holding would cause greater self-censorship
than would application of the actual malice standard, allowed li-
bel recovery by private figures upon a showing of mere
negligence. 17 0
The holding in Gertz was based, in part, on the lack of access
to the media held by private figures.' 7 ' The Court noted that
"public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more real-
istic opportunity to counteract false statements than private indi-
viduals normally enjoy."'172 Consequently, when a publication in-
volves a public figure, the press is given a freer hand because the
public figure's access to the media means the truth is more likely
to prevail. However, where the publication involves a private fig-
ure with limited access to the media, the truth is less able to pre-
vail through public debate. In this latter situation, courts restrict
the hand of the press,' 73 thereby giving truth an advantage in its
competition with falsehood.
Turning to the context of altered quotations, concern for pri-
vate figures tends to support the literal rule. Although the first
amendment interest in self-government is best served when citi-
zens are engaged and skeptical, 4 it is not inconsistent with first
amendment analysis to force journalists to adhere to certain fun-
damental conventions upon which the average citizen can rely
without question. 75 Given the expectations of the average reader,
truth eventually will prevail." Schauer, supra note 2, at 271.
170. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
171. Id. at 344.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., id. at 323. It has been argued that the Court's opinion in Gertz is
hostile to the marketplace of ideas. See Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First
Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REv. 915, 952-54 (1978). This claim is warranted
if one views Gertz solely in contrast with the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (holding that private figure plaintiffs were required to
show actual malice where the alleged defamation was related to a public issue). While the
Gertz Court may have been hostile to a laissez faire approach, which assumes a perfect
market, the Court did not wholly reject the marketplace of ideas theory of the first amend-
ment. Rather, the Gertz Court was cognizant of the imperfections in the marketplace of
ideas and acted accordingly. The Gertz Court did not abandon the market, it merely al-
lowed some regulation of the market.
174. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
175. That the determinative inquiry here involves an "assess[ment] [of] the average
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then, the Supreme Court should have adopted the literal rule, be-
cause the convention with respect to quotations is that "quotation
marks do indicate exact renderings.1
17 6
For the first amendment to vindicate successfully the social
interests entrusted to its care, the public must be allowed to evalu-
ate independently the statements presented to it. When the pres-
entation deviates from traditional conventions, this task becomes
unnecessarily complicated. Failure to publish verbatim renderings
will impair the assessment of even the most well-educated and
skeptical observers.1 " The social theories underlying the first
amendment require that the public be presented with information
and that the public's evaluation of the information be unimpaired.
The literal rule is most consistent with these first amendment
values.
A further argument in favor of the literal rule concerns the
dissemination of new ideas. Vindication of the first amendment's
social interests requires that all ideas relevant to political decision
making be placed before the public. Expressing a new idea often
requires assigning new meaning to existing words. 178 In this con-
reader's view. . . rather than that of either the most skeptical or most credulous reader" is
established by Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1127 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct.
2695 (1990). While Oilman discussed the average reader's view concerning the distinction
between fact and opinion in the context of a defamation action, it has also been held that
the average reader's view should govern in the context of fabricated quotations:
'[n]ot only is the language employed to be regarded with reference to the
actual words used. . . in passing upon the sufficiency of [the allegedly defama-
tory] language as stating a cause of action, a court is to place itself in the situa-
tion of the hearer or reader, and determine the sense or meaning of the language
of the complaint for libelous publication according to its natural and popular
construction.'
Selleck v, Globe Int'l, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 1131, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 843 (1985)
(quoting MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 546-47, 343 P.2d 36, 41
(1959)). Thus, the understanding of the average reader must be assessed to determine
which rule most effectively advances the objectives of the first amendment.
176. J. OLEN, supra note 91, at 98-99.
177. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1549 (9th Cir.
1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (Robert Coles, a leading psychiatrist, premised his conclu-
sions regarding Masson upon the quotes by Masson which Coles believed to be verbatim.),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
178. See F. WmsaSNN, supra note 25, at 323-25 ("Sometimes. . . a word is used in
a quite novel way . . . then we step beyond the bounds of ordinary language; we extend
language or we construct a new symobolism."); Schauer, supra note 2, at 283 ("[T]o de-
scribe something completely new or unconventional, or to convey an idea not previously put
into words, the speaker must use language in a somewhat unconventional fashion." (foot-
note omitted)).
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text word choice is critical, and deviations from the original state-
ment may result in new ideas being kept from the public. Neither
the self-government nor the search for truth theory will abide such
a circumstance. Thus, the literal rule is more appropriate.
B. Self-Fulfillment a79
Although Areopagitica'80 is most often cited in support of the
search for truth theory, Milton also recognized the importance of
freedom of speech to the pursuit of self-fulfillment."" Milton ob-
served that writings "contain a potency of life in them to be as
active as that soul was whose progeny they are."18 2 This recogni-
tion that self-expression is the progeny of the soul demonstrates
Milton's appreciation of the close relation between self-expression
and self-fulfillment. 183 Milton's argument indicates a deeply-
179. This section considers a speaker's interest in self-expression, and more particu-
larly in the preservation of word choice. This interest is wholly self-contained; it is in no
way affected by any interests of the larger community. Self-fulfillment deals solely with an
individual's autonomy in representing one's self to the community. See generally T. EMER-
SON, supra note 121, at 4-7 (discussing an individual's right to self-fulfillment). The vindi-
cation of this interest might be thought to fall under an action for false light invasion of
privacy rather than defamation. Although these torts overlap substantially, they are distin-
guishable. Defamation is designed "to protect a person's interest in a good reputation"
while false light invasion of privacy is intended "to protect a person's interest in being let
alone." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 864 (5th ed. 1984). An action in defamation will lie only for harm to one's
reputation caused by a false statement of fact. However, it is possible to recover damages
under false light invasion of privacy even where the false statement of fact does not harm
one's reputation, though typically these latter claims include recovery for reputational
harm. Id.
When the injury involves reputational interest, the appropriate remedy is a defamation
action even though the plaintiff may also succeed under a false light claim. See, e.g., Car-
son v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (the defendant wholly fabricated all
conversations between the plaintiff and his employer, yet the court dealt with the claim as
sounding in defamation rather than false light invasion of privacy). If the plaintiff was not
allowed to bring a defamation suit in these cases, similar injuries would be treated differ-
ently with the distinction resting on the infirm foundation of "artful pleading." Zimmer-
man, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 364, 396
(1989). But see Schwartz, Explaining and justifying a Limited Tort of Invasion of False
Light Invasion of Privacy, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 885 (1991) (false light actions are
appropriate when a false statement is highly offensive but not disparaging, and thus not
actionable as defamatory).
180. J. MILTON, supra note 84, at 42-138.
181. See id. at 72 (The self-fulfillment theory works in conjunction with the search
for truth. In self-fulfillment, individuals freely express themselves and these expressions
supply the information for the search for truth. Freedom of expression is needed to satisfy
self-fulfillment, which in turn furthers the collective search for truth.).
182. Id. at 48-50.
183. Those who read Milton's argument narrowly as supporting only a marketplace
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rooted recognition that expressions chosen by a speaker have great
personal consequence.
First amendment jurisprudence is no less cognizant of the in-
dividual interests embodied in self-expression. The idea that the
first amendment protects a speaker's interest in self-fulfillment
was first proffered by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v California."8 4
Brandeis asserted that "[t]hose who won our independence be-
lieved that the final end of the State was to make men free to
develop their faculties; They believed liberty to be the secret
of happiness "186 Legal scholars have also concluded that an
important purpose of freedom of speech is its role "as a means of
assuring individual self-fulfillment."1"6
The Supreme Court most clearly embraced the self-fulfill-
ment rationale in Cohen v California.8 7 Cohen was convicted of
disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck
the Draft." ss The Court reversed the conviction, grounding its de-
cision on the individual interests protected by the first amend-
ment. " 9 The Court began by characterizing Cohen as falling into
the category of "persons who wish to ventilate their dissident
views."' 90 The Court thus focused on Cohen's right to express his
views rather than on the need for the public to hear them. This
formulation of the self-fulfillment rationale shows it to be the
of ideas theory miss its point. Even the arguments Milton makes in support of such a model
construe the marketplace as a means to self-fulfillment. See id. at 72 ("Since the
knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human
virtue how can we more safely, and with less danger scout into the regions of sin and
falsity than by reading all manner of tractates, and hearing all manner of reason?").
184. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see Blasi, The First Amend-
ment and the Ideal of Civic Courage in Whitney, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653 (1987)
(Brandeis, in his Whitney concurrence, envisioned the first amendment as designed to in-
still hope, imagination, and character in the citizenry).
185. Id. at 375.
186. E.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970) ("The
proper end of man is the realization of Ins character and potentialities as a human being.
For the achievement of this self-realization the mind must be free. Hence suppression of
expression is an affront to the dignity of man."). Some scholars have gone so far as to
suggest that protection of the individual interests embodied m the first amendment is its
sole aim. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech 25 UCLA L. REv.
964, 966 (1978) ("Speech is protected not as a means to a collective good but because of
the value of speech conduct to the individual."); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, ,130 U.
PA. L. Rav. 591 (1982).
187. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
188. Id. at 16.
189. Id. at 26.
190. Id. at 23.
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"flip-side" of the social theories, which hold that speech should be
protected to enable the public to make decisions effectively."' 1
The Cohen Court concluded that "much linguistic expression
serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas
capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as
much for their emotive as their cognitive force. 1 92 In order to
effect the first amendment's goal of advancing self-fulfillment, the
Court found it necessary to protect both the cognitive and emotive
aspects of speech.
Adapting the self-fulfillment theory of the first amendment to
the context of altered quotations, the holding in Cohen can be
construed as a recognition "that the choice of words itself may be
part of the message."193 Such a construction supports application
of the literal rule. Even if the publisher is able to alter the quota-
tion in a manner that does not change the substantive content or
alternatively maintains the signification of the statement,194 th
speaker's word choice is not preserved. To use Cohen as an exam-
ple, had Cohen issued his exhortation, "Fuck the Draft," and a
reporter then quoted him as saying, "I am profoundly opposed to
the draft," the emotive force of Cohen's statement would have
been substantially diminished. The self-fulfillment rationale holds
that a misquotation of this sort would seriously impede a primary
goal behind the first amendment. 9 5 The essence rule, however,
permits such an alteration. The first amendment interest in the
facilitation of self-fulfillment, therefore, is best advanced by the
literal rule.
191. See supra notes 119-40 and accompanying text. It is the person being quoted
who is protected under the first amendment's self-fulfillment rationale, not the public's
right to hear.
192. Id. at 26.
193. Schauer, supra note 2, at 281.
194. Signification is the property of a statement that determines whether the state-
ment is true. Signification has two aspects: subjectively, "it 'expresses' the condition of the
person uttering it," and objectively, "it points outside this present condition to something in
virtue of which it is true or false." B. RuSSELL, supra note 25, at 128. Two differently
worded statements may have the same signification. For example, "A is the employer of B"
has the same signification as "B is the employee of A." Id. at 127. However, the first
statement expresses an emphasis on the role of A in the employment relationship, while the
second statement emphasizes the role of B. An alteration in emphasis, therefore, can hinder
a speaker's ability to achieve self-fulfillment, even though signification is preserved.
195. See Baker, supra note 186, at 994 ("To engage voluntarily in a speech act is to
engage in self-definition .... ").
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C. The Reputation Interest
The constitutional dimensions of the reputation interest were
first recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.198 This recog-
nition was implicit in the majority's rejection of Justice Black's
argument that the first amendment stands as an absolute bar to
defamation suits brought by public officials.197 Subsequently, rep-
utation was explicitly accepted as an interest entitled to "recogni-
tion . . . as a basic of our constitutional system."' 9 The Court
has characterized the constitutional interest in reputation as
"[ihe right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt[, which] reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of or-
dered liberty."' 99
It is not immediately clear whether this reputation interest is
individual or social in nature. Reputatioh has an inherently indi-
vidual quality because it is a fundamental element of one's indi-
viduality.200 However, there is an inextricable social element in
the concept of reputation as wellS2M-it is society's perceptions
that comprise reputation. This paradox can be resolved through
social psychology. The symbolic interactionism school 20 2 views
reputation as arising from the interaction between an individual's
personality and the perceptions of the community and its institu-
tions.20 3 Thus, the interaction between an individual and society
196. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 160-63.
198. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-43 (1974).
199. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring). "
200. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1974)
(White, J., concurring) ("[W]e have cherished the average citizen's reputation interest
enough to afford him a fair chance to vindicate himself in an action for libel. ... ).
201. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
743, 743 (1986) ("Reputation is the extension and elaboration of that recognition which
lies at the basis of our social existence.") (emphasis in original). An example of one social
element of reputation is the need for public trust in order for public officials to be effective.
Id. at 745. This public trust aspect is actually an element of the self-government theory of
the first amendment. The self-government theory is discussed supra notes 125-35 and ac-
companying text.
202. See generally J. CHARON, SYMBOLIC INTERAcTnoNIsM: AN INTRODUCTION. AN
INTERPRETATION, AN INTEGRATION (1979) (symbolic interactionism views the individual,
or self, as a social creation resulting from one's interactions with the larger society).
203. See Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 708-10 (1986).
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yields an individual quality of reputation in spite of its inseparable
social element.20 4 The law is in accord with the social sciences on
this point, as the law seeks to protect reputation as an individual
interest. o5
Recognition of the individual's interest in reputation is ac-
knowledged in the role of defamation actions to provide individu-
als the opportunity to vindicate their reputational interests.0 6 The
strength of this constitutional interest is clearly manifested in Ro-
senblatt v. Baer,z0 7 in which Justice Stewart asserted that the
right to protect one's reputation is as central a concept to "or-
dered liberty" as is the concept of the "dignity and worth of every
human being."208 Justice Stewart's characterization of the individ-
ual's reputation interest was subsequently accepted by the
Court 20 9 to expand the protection against defamation beyond that
which would have been allowed under a New York Times actual
malice standard.2 x°
This strong commitment to protecting reputation supports the
adoption of the literal rule. By using the speaker's words verbatim,
the publisher cannot impair the reputation of the speaker.211 Any
204. Symbolic interactionism holds that "society . . .makes possible the self." J.
CHARON, supra note 202, at 64. Although it views humans as entirely social, symbolic
interactionism recognizes a self that results from social interaction. Id. at 63-65. Thus, in
spite of the ubiquity of society, there are individual interests, such as reputation.
205. Justice Stewart focused on "[t]he right of a man to the protection of his own
reputation." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice
White looked to "the average citizen's reputation interest." Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 261-262 (1974) (White, J., concurring). The Gertz Court sought
to protect against "injury to the reputation of private individuals." Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757 (1985) (commenting that a state should not be lightly required to
set aside the interest in compensating private individuals for damage to reputation).
206. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 261-62 (while individuals can not force the press to
print retractions and clarifications, they can get judgments and monetary awards against
the press).
207. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
208. Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
209. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341; see Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757 (utilizing the
approach approved in Gertz, the Court held that the state has an interest in allowing for
compensation to private individuals for injury to their reputation).
210. E.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 763 (holding that because of the strength of
the individual reputation interest, presumed and punitive damages could be awarded in a
defamation action involving a private figure plaintiff on a showing of something less than
actual malice); Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (holding that a private figure plaintiff claiming to have
been defamed by a publication relating to a public issue may recover actual damages for
individual harm to reputation upon a showing of mere negligence rather than actual
malice).
211. The obvious exception is when a literally accurate quote is published out of
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claim disallowed under the literal rule would also be disallowed
under the essence rule, since it is impossible for the essence of the
words attributed to the speaker to deviate from the essence of the
words spoken when the words attributed are identical to those spo-
ken. The converse, however, is not necessarily true: as both Mas-
son opinions demonstrate, the essence rule disallows claims that
the literal rule would allow.21 2 Under the essence rule, cases in
which a jury could reasonably find harm to an individual's reputa-
tion might go uncompensated.
IV. WEIGHING THE INTERESTS
The analysis sanctioned by the Court in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan213 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.21 4 requires that an
accommodation of the constitutional and reputational interests be
reached in deriving the legal rules of libel. Within such a frame-
work, there are meritorious arguments to be made in favor of both
the literal and essence rules.
Under the social theories of the first amendment, the Su-
preme Court has placed great importance on minimizing self-cen-
sorship.21 5 The essence rule offers the attractive advantage of min-
imizing the "chilling effect" of defamation law. However, the
value in avoiding self-censorship is not unqualified.216 The social
theories behind the first amendment also require that the integrity
of public debate be preserved. 1 7 In order to preserve the integrity
of public debate, some self-censorship inevitably will occur. Pro-
context. Discussion of the law on this subject is beyond the scope of this note.
212. Clearly, the literal rule would lead to a different outcome than the Ninth Cir-
cuit's. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 2419 (1991). As to the outcome arrived at by the Supreme Court, the Court found that
the inaccurate statement regarding Masson's motive for changing his name was not suffi-
ciently false. The literal rule would impose a different analysis and possibly a different
outcome. See supra note 72.
213. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
214. 413 U.S. 323 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 164-73.
215. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (to
avoid self-censorship, the Court must be protective of speech); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (concern over self-censorship justifies, in part, the high ac-
tual malice standard).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 160-68.
217. In terms of self-government, rules of order are a prerequisite to effective politi-
cal decision making. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Further, without regula-
tion of the marketplace of ideas, the search for truth could be hindered. See, e.g., Epstein,
supra note 118, at 798-99 (without government protection of the marketplace of ideas, lies
would go unpunished and misinformation would be prevalent).
13071991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tecting public debate is best advanced by the literal rule.2"8
The trade-off discussed above is affected by other competing
considerations that make the adoption of the literal rule more at-
tractive. At present, there is a widespread perception that the
press lacks credibility.219 In order for the social contract between
the public and the press to produce the results envisioned by the
first amendment, the press must have the public's trust. The lit-
eral rule, being more in tune with public expectation, readily ad-
vances this goal.
Second, a more laissez faire approach, such as the essence
rule, is only justified once the public is in a position to perform its
responsibility of independently evaluating the information and
opinions secured through the first amendment. By adopting the
essence rule, and thus permitting journalists to inject their own
subjective interpretations of the speaker's quote, the public's abil-
ity to evaluate information and opinions would be impaired.220 To
disarm the public in this way is inconsistent with first amendment
protections. Given that the literal rule is more compatible with the
public's role and the public's expectations, the literal rule is more
appropriate.
Even if it were found that the social interests of the first
amendment require minimizing the "chilling effect" of defamation
actions at the expense of informed public debate, the strength of
these social interests must be assessed before weighing them
against the other relevant interests. The "chilling effect" at issue
here would cause publishers to refrain from enclosing statements
in quotation marks, thereby conveying to readers that the material
only paraphrases the words of the speaker. 221 This consideration
carries significantly less weight than the self-censorship involved
in New York Times, for instance, where the fear was that poten-
tial speakers would remain silent. Since the risk here is not si-
lence, the strength of this consideration is diluted.222
218. See supra text accompanying note 176.
219. See S. KLAiDMAN & T. BEAucHAMP, supra note 87, at 158 (showing public
distrust of the press running as high as 75%).
220. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1549 (9th Cir.
1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (recognizing that because an unqualified quotation creates
a presumption of literal veracity, the potential exists for serious harm if the words are not
completely accurate), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
222. The concerns behind the "chilling effect" are further mitigated when the literal
rule is viewed in light of the plaintiff's full burden. In addition to falsity and culpability the
plaintiff must show the altered quotation to be defamatory. The Hotchner principle re-
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Further, the constitutional framework requires assessment of
the individual self-fulfillment interest embodied in the first amend-
ment223 as well as the individual interest in reputation.224 These
interests clearly and strongly militate in favor of the literal rule.
An argument favoring adoption of the essence rule can be
made. Although the information "chilled" may not affect the abil-
ity of the public to assess the important issues of the day, some
harm to an individual's reputation must be tolerated to avoid self-
censorship. While the essence rule would exact a toll on individual
interests, the Court has, at least in some situations, found this to
be an acceptable price for self-government. 25
The framework fashioned by the Court to weigh and accom-
modate the social and individual interests, however, mandates a
contrary result. Assuming the interest in avoiding self-censorship
prevails in the social interest realm, it must be weighed against
the asserted individual interests. The approach of Gertz is particu-
larly instructive. The Gertz Court noted that in New York Times
the individual interests gave way to the social interest in avoiding
self-censorship because the individual interests of the public figure
were relatively weak.226 When the same interest in avoiding self-
censorship came up against the strengthened individual interest of
a private figure in Gertz, however, the barriers to maintaining a
libel suit were rolled back.227
In the Masson situation, the social interest in avoiding self-
quires the plaintiff show the altered quotation to have caused harm to his or her reputation
above that which would have occurred had the defendant published a verbatim transcrip-
tion. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. When a plaintiff fails to prove an
alteration is, in the eyes of the community, substantively dissimilar to the actual statement,
the plaintiff will fail to show defamatory impact. Thus, the opponent of the executions of
Sacco and Vanzetti could not prevail because the alteration was not itself harmful, in the
eyes of the community, to the opponent's reputation. See supra note 2 and accompanying
text. Conversely, it is likely that the Vietnam War protester could prove that the alteration
itself increased the defamatory impact of the publication. See supra note I and accompa-
nying text.
223. See supra notes 179-95 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 196-213 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986)
(placing upon plaintiff the burden of proving falsity protects speech on public concerns);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281-82 (1964) (discussing the privilege
afforded public officials).
226. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-46 (1974); see also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-62 (1985) (when the first
amendment social interests are weaker, the Court will tip the scales in favor of the individ-
ual reputation interest).
227. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-46.
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censorship is particularly weak, while the individual interests at
stake are substantial. A reasonable assessment, then, must favor
the literal rule.
CONCLUSION
This note has sought to determine the most appropriate rule
to apply when a publisher misquotes a speaker who then seeks to
recover damages through a defamation action. First amendment
doctrine mandates that the choice between the literal and essence
rules be governed by weighing the individual's interest in self-ful-
fillment and reputation with the social interests in self-government
and the search for truth. The social interests embodied in the first
amendment are equivocal on this point, while the individual inter-
ests strongly support adoption of the literal rule. First amendment
doctrine, therefore, compels adoption of the literal rule, which
takes into account both society's and the individual's interests, and
the Supreme Court's contrary holding is ill-founded.
NEIL J. KINKOPF
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